the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR) and Genome Canada to engage in critical debate and policy development with industry over (1) the nature and degree of funding for medical research; (2) the importance of public-private partnerships in commercializing that research; (3) the extent of intellectual property and regulatory (IPR) rights attached to research products; and (4) the manner in which evidence of safety and effi cacy is accrued and judged, given the present "front-loaded" approval regime and the potential "progressive licensing regime" for market authorization. 4 Finally, it has become commonplace in media discussions of national productivity and prosperity to focus on stimulating innovation in technology-heavy sectors, particularly in the life and medical sciences.
There are a number of reasons why patent jurisprudence handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is important for scholars of Canadian health law and policy -or indeed for those of any other nation seeking to leverage its domestic science and technology base to enhance productivity in the global marketplace. These can be grouped into three broad categories, each of which revolves around a central focus on IPR rights. The fourth, dealing with a domestic "innovation ecology," and its relation to a global systems-based innovation ecology, is dealt with separately in a companion paper. 5 From an economic perspective, Canada is one of the largest trading partners of the United States. 6 Even with a relatively small population of 32M and a GDP of U.S. $1T, total trade between nations was U.S. $500B in 2005. Added to this is the fact that the majority of successful Canadian small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the biomedical industry typically have some form of venture capital funding from U.S. fi rms. 7 Thus, foreign sources of capital, particularly those from our largest and most valuable trading partner, continue to be important to the success of local fi rms. A related issue is that of economic effi ciency for Canadian fi rms, particularly SMEs coming out of Canadian universities. This is because the costs of patenting and patent litigation escalate dramatically to the degree there are different standards of patentability in different jurisdictions. This concern extends to the growing desire by fi rms and government for regulatory harmony with the United States and European Union and for deregulation generally, which has become a topic of increasing debate over the last decade via the Smart Regulations policy 8 -and in a manner more focused on medical product development owing to assertive harmonization efforts by Health Canada and Industry Canada in the context of drug approval, public-private partnerships in medical research, and IPR rights associated with food and drugs legislation and regulation.
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A second set of issues revolves around the importance of IPR rights to a system of state-sponsored public health. IPR rights are responsible for the determination of whether and for how long products will be protected by patent and regulatory monopolies, and thus whether they are affordable and accessible to large swaths of the public, particularly those who are not shielded from monopoly costs via health care insurance. For example, the availability of cheaper generic alternatives is controlled in Canada, 10 as in ( showing that, over the last seven years, foreign venture capitalists have been the fastest-growing source of venture capital in Canada); Nancy Hizaka-Vilardo, "Canadian Venture Capital Overview," (Paper presented to the University of Toronto, 2006) 14 In addition to availability per se, IPR rights, and the degree to which they are harmonized with those of other jurisdictions, also dictate the safety and effi cacy profi le of marketed drugs, whether this is in the context of the historical front-loaded regulatory approval system (based in large part on the precautionary principle) or the new back-loaded progressive licensing regime (based on risk management principles) which would see certain drugs on market after Phase 2 testing rather than following testing on larger Phase 3 cohorts. 15 Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly understood that the basket of IPR rights attaching to medical inventions dictates the distributive allocation of the benefi ts of publicly funded medical research amongst public and private actors responsible for generating, capitalizing and consuming them. 16 Thus, IPR rights play a major role in determining the availability, price, safety and effi cacy of medical products and testing procedures, as well as the degree and manner in which various strata of society benefi t from the products of commercialization-intensive, publicly-funded research. A third set of reasons focuses on the institutional structures that underpin IPR rights afforded to medical inventions. Primary among these is the fact that United States Patent and Trademark Offi ce (U.S. PTO) practice dominates technology and patent-intensive industries such as those in chemical, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, internet-communications technology and natural resources sectors. Due to the larger and more dominant market, the U.S. PTO is often the fi rst global application for Canadian fi rms. rested on a "false caricature" of the Federal Circuit's TSM inquiry as rigid, claiming that the Federal Circuit repeatedly held that the TSM test encompasses any available indication that a practitioner in the art would have had some reason to select certain elements of the invention, and thus includes evidence of "implicit" sources of motivation. As such, KSR and Telefl ex took opposing views of the Federal Circuit's TSM test: the former claiming it was narrow, rigid and exclusionary and the latter claiming that it was broad, fl exible and contextual. The United States Solicitor General (Solicitor General) was invited to submit a brief in October 2005. The Solicitor General took the position that the Federal Circuit's TSM test confl icted with previous SCOTUS patent jurisprudence, placing undue restrictions on invalidating obvious patents under §103. This in turn resulted in unnecessary litigation costs and harm to competition. The doctrinal focus of the government's brief was that Graham set forth a "fl exible and functional" approach for determining obviousness which unlike the Federal Circuit's rigid TSM test, represented an objective yet contextual framework for determining obviousness. A second and related concern expressed by the Solicitor General was that the Federal Circuit erred in treating one specifi c method of determining obviousness (TSM) as the exclusive means of showing obviousness, thus forgoing the fl exible and functional approach mandated by Graham. The government also noted 31 that prior high court jurisprudence stood for the proposition that the standard for obviousness is critical to ensure that free exploitation of ideas is the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent monopoly is the exception. 32 A standard for obviousness that is too low inevitably entails substantial transaction costs to the public, as it sows the seeds for subsequent patent litigation, grants patentees unjustifi ed rewards for disclosing non-innovative subject matter, forecloses competitors from using the public storehouse of knowledge that should be freely available to all and prevents the public from enjoying the full benefi t of the traditional patent monopoly. at 3-4 and 11-12. 33 Citing an undocumented study by a "patent law professor," Denis Crouch stated in his popular patent blog (Patently-O) that in cases where the U.S. Solicitor General issued an unqualifi ed grant recommendation, grant rate by SCOTUS unqualifi ed recommendation by the Solicitor General presumably all but guaranteed grant of certiorari, which turned out to be correct. The tone of the Solicitor General brief comports with the decision by SCOTUS in Graham, 34 where the court held the patent system was a carefully crafted bargain designed to encourage the creation and disclosure of new technologies in return for the exclusive right to practise the invention and that the obviousness requirement serves the important means of "weeding out" undesirable inventions. Indeed, as noted by Lunney, 35 the greater the number of inventions that are in fact non-inventive (obvious) yet deemed patentable by the courts, the greater the transaction costs involved to the system, including determining the value of a patent for purposes of licensing, assignment and settlement, whether and how frequently parties will litigate patents, and how many patents a fi rm will obtain on the same or similar technology in order to avoid litigation. Such patents remain "in terrorem of the art," 36 enabling patentees to extract unwarranted license fees and monopoly rents under circumstances where they would otherwise receive nothing for such non-inventive disclosures. 37 As discussed previously, the notion that the standard for obviousness is an important policy lever for government to control the socially effi cient transfer of wealth in the context of "needed goods" such as innovative medical products and tools has particular relevance to multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology fi rms. only at the narrow problem the patentee was trying to solve; determining that a person having ordinary skill in the art would be led only to that portion of the prior art designed to solve the same problem; determining that a patent claim could never be proved by showing the combination of elements was "obvious to try;" and by placing too much emphasis on hindsight bias in its determination of obviousness. 42 The court rejected the Federal Circuit's TSM test as narrow and rigid, shifting it instead to a "helpful insight."
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Based on these errors, SCOTUS reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. 44 By encompassing both explicit (pre-KSR TSM test) and implicit factors (PHOSITA going beyond the specifi c problem to be solved and related prior art using common sense and ordinary creativity), SCOTUS sidestepped the tautology inherent in the version of the TSM test applied by the Federal Circuit before Dystar 45 and Alza. 46 That is, an invention is obvious in the context of "Problem A" only where Problem A was expressly addressed in the prior art and was not solved. Previously, prior art used to identify or solve any other problem (e.g., Problem B, C, etc.); no matter how related it might be to Problem A was deemed to be insuffi ciently specifi c to guide the court to an opinion that the invention was obvious. The nuances of the decision relevant to Canadian law are presented in Section III.A., below. The aftermath of the decision was marked by apparent controversy, if nothing else. In the days following release of the decision, there was anxiety on several high traffi c patent blogs, 47 leading to speculation that KSR would open the fl oodgates to increased obviousness rejections, declarations of existing patents as invalid and increased litigation for actors in patent-intensive sectors -in short, "dark clouds of uncertainty" for paten- affi rm that (a) KSR returned emphasis of the obviousness determination to the broad and fl exible Graham factors 52 informed by the objective yet contextual requirements of §103, and (b) that the TSM test remains relevant in determining obviousness. As discussed in detail below, the decision by SCOTUS in KSR is consistent with the view that inventions come into being in a highly complex and inherently creative fashion rather than in a simple linear and discrete manner.
III. Implications for Canadian IPR Rights Landscape
A. Relevance to Canadian Patent Law Embedded Within a Global Patent Jurisdiction
(i) Creativity and Inventiveness of the PHOSITA
Central to KSR is how scientists working in the relevant art of invention were perceived by the U.S. Supreme Court and the reach of that perception into the construction and application of the legal test for obviousness. The decision underscored the inherent creativity of the PHOSITA and the ability of skilled technicians to employ that creativity both explicitly and implicitly 66 and is employed in a state of the art research facility equipped with all relevant equipment and technology needed to derive or at least understand the invention. To make matters worse, the PHOSITA is deemed to spend his or her daily life in experimentation in pursuit of these goals, 67 yet still has no spark of creativity. Ironically, construction of the mythical PHOSITA was intended to render the test for obviousness objective rather than subjective, yet over time its application by Canadian courts has turned the test into one that is highly rigid in nature, not unlike the Federal Circuit's pre-KSR TSM test. Given that the skilled technician has a mind willing to understand 68 everything that is necessary in order to successfully solve the problem before him or her 69 and
is not looking to fail in his or her research and development endeavors, 70 it
is perhaps understandable that a number of Canadian judges are beginning to take the position that it is appropriate for the court to cast the defi nition of the PHOSITA "well above the concept of an individual having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination." 71 Importantly, imparting creativity and inventiveness to the PHOSITA comports with the realities of contemporary drug development in multinational fi rms and is consistent with the fact that the PHOSITA provides the lens through which the court must gaze not only for obviousness, but also for most other aspects of the patentability analysis, such as anticipation, utility, enablement, sound prediction, ambiguity, lack of novelty, improper subject matter and whether the patent claims are broader than the disclosure section of the patent. This lack of inherent creativity and inventiveness of the PHOSITA is the focal point for a number of undue "binary" (all or nothing) determinations relating to obviousness by Canadian courts, such as (1) whether the PHO-SITA may properly consider routine, or indeed any, testing in the lead-up to invention in his or her determination of obviousness; (2) whether a PHOSI-TA exhibits more than a mere scintilla of inventiveness in his or her analysis; (3) whether the PHOSITA properly considered the impugned invention "obvious to try;" and (4) whether the PHOSITA "would have" v. "could have" arrived at the invention. The latter two issues relate directly to the creative capacity of the PHOSITA, as clearly a complete lack of inventiveness would preclude any such testing, even though it may have been completely obvious to undertake it based on the prior art. 72 The Canadian position on each of these points stands in stark contrast to appellate patent jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, particularly following KSR. Generally, when assessing the issue of obviousness, courts are charged with undertaking a determination of whether the impugned invention represents an inventive step over the prior art, including previously disclosed inventions. 73 Under s. 28.3 of the Canadian Patent Act, 74 the lens through which the court must gaze is that of the skilled technician. An issue that frequently comes up in the obviousness analysis is whether or not experimental research or testing conducted in the lead-up to invention may be properly contemplated by the PHOSITA in order to conclude whether or not the invention constitutes a suffi cient inventive step to be patentable. This is a critical component of the obviousness test, given that scientifi c inventions -particularly those in the life sciences -do not come about de novo. The issue of "testing" is thus shorthand for whatever scientifi c experimentation and research were conducted prior to crystallization of the invention. Testing that is non-inventive has been referred to by American, and some Canadian, courts as routine, ordinary, logical or workshop in nature. Patentability of inventions based on routine workshop-type activity and the relationship thereof to innovation and competition law has a rich history in American, compared to Canadian appellate patent law. 75 American courts have generally taken the position that routine workshop activity is not deserving of the patent monopoly and stifl es competition. 76 Under KSR, routine for a patent in Canada must be subject-matter that would not have been obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains, having regard to: (a) information disclosed more than one year before the fi ling date by the applicant, or by a person who obtained knowledge, directly or indirectly, from the applicant in such a manner that the information became available to the public in Canada or elsewhere; and (b) information disclosed before the claim date by a person not mentioned in paragraph (a) in such a manner that the information became available to the public in Canada or elsewhere. 75 For review, see Bouchard "Living," supra note 38. See also Hotchkiss, supra note 32; Graham, supra note 19; and KSR, supra note 18. 76 In Hotchkiss, SCOTUS held (at 267): "Unless more ingenuity and skill ... were required ... than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with testing in the lead-up period to invention that has a reasonable expectation of success can be properly contemplated by an ordinarily creative PHOSITA in the obviousness analysis. 77 SCOTUS was clear on this issue, stating 78 that "the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under patent law;" otherwise, "patents might stifl e rather than promote the progress of useful arts," contrary to the United States Constitution.
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Unfortunately, this is not true of the Canadian PHOSITA, 80 who by virtue of a complete lack of inventiveness cannot contemplate even the simplest testing leading to invention. Thus, scientifi c testing in the lead-up to invention vitiates obviousness in Canada, but not in the United States. As a result, the reference point for the obviousness analysis in Canada is the PHOSITA who has much less than the average level of normative creativity, or is indeed no PHOSITA at all due to a de minimus level of creativity. 81 The result in either case is the removal of the PHOSITA from the determination of obviousness -contrary to section 28.3 of the Patent Act.
The level of creativity imparted to the PHOSITA by Canadian courts not only infl uences the determination of obviousness in the context of routine research but, as a PHOSITA with no inventiveness whatsoever clearly could not even contemplate testing in the lead-up to invention, it also forms the basis for rejection of obviousness in the "obvious to try" or "worth a try" cases (though one might argue these are different terms), as well as the requirement in Canadian law that a skilled technician "would" have arrived at an invention rather than "could" have arrived at it using ordinarily creative abilities. In other words, the skilled technician must have (rather than may have) come directly to the invention given the prior art and problem to be solved. The former is akin to the rigid requirement of the pre-KSR TSM test the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. in the context of "Problem A" described supra, while the latter is consistent with the ability of the PHOSITA to locate the invention implicitly in the prior art using an ordinary level of creativity under KSR. The lack of inventive ability of the Canadian PHOSITA is therefore responsible for the fact that four major areas of patent law in Canada are in complete disagreement with leading American patent jurisprudence. A similar discordance exists with respect to the creative abilities of the English PHOSITA.
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B. Potential Impact on Canadian Inventors and Firms
On one hand, a low standard for patentability in Canada compared with jurisdictions with similar patent legislation will lead to a larger number of Canadian patents being issued. Similarly, multinational fi rms who have had weak patents invalidated in American, European or pan-Asian courts may see Canada in a comparatively attractive light (provided the market is suffi ciently large to bear the costs of acquiring and enforcing IPR rights). In this sense Canada will be seen as a source of low hanging fruit for patents of a certain value.
On the other hand, it is equally if not more plausible that a comparative lowering of the standard for patentability in Canada may place undue and heavy burdens on Canadian inventors and fi rms that attempt to commercialize patented products and processes in the United States or more globally. In a global market where regulatory and jurisprudential harmony is becoming an increasingly valued commodity, domestic outliers will likely be seen as incongruent and costly outsiders from the perspective of both governments and fi rms. Clearly a scenario such as this, while hypothetical, has the potential to diminish the acquisition and licensing of disparate forms of intellectual property, but also to inhibit commercial partnership arrangements and render valuation of patents in the context of due diligence activities more expensive and burdensome.
Given the escalating costs of patenting globally, a disparate set of patentability requirements in one jurisdiction would further suggest that acquiring global IPR rights may become prohibitively expensive for inventors and fi rms, especially for more vulnerable SMEs located in smaller markets. Not surprisingly, cost and administrative considerations of this nature have been frequently expressed by entrepreneurs and patent attorneys on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border since KSR was released. Indeed, Canadian fi rms and inventors, and their international partners, may decide not to patent in Canada at all to the extent that the requirements and costs of doing so are out of line with either their global IPR rights strategy or the size of the Canadian market. None of this bodes particularly well for the short-term global competitiveness and productivity of Canadians, and would be particularly ironic should the current test for obviousness breach any of the constitutional requirements to be unequivocal, predictable and fair, as argued previously.
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C. Importance of the Standard for Obviousness for Innovation and Competition
It is relatively straightforward that a disparate set of patentability requirements may be more costly in the short term to Canadian fi rms and inventors. Less obvious, however, is that a lower standard for patentability (in Canada or otherwise) may inhibit inventors and fi rms in their inventive and innovative endeavors over a longer time frame and where, as is true in the current public health context, the commercialization, availability and price of patented products are signifi cantly infl uenced by domestic and international IPR rights.
Indeed, the importance of the push-pull between obviousness and inventiveness for a broad system of IPR rights-based innovation cannot be overestimated. Both the U.S. Solicitor General and SCOTUS have highlighted the importance of patent law in balancing innovation and competition. As noted by SCOTUS in KSR, "Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, for patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility." 84 As a result, so-called weak patents ply property" 90 and is consistent with the court's jurisprudence to the effect that a patent of uncertain scope is tantamount to a public nuisance and that it is the proper policy of patent law to keep the high economic and other costs attaching to poorly circumscribed patents to a minimum. 91 The position taken by SCOTUS in its leading patent jurisprudence, from Hotchkiss, through Graham to KSR, has been remarkably consistent over nearly a century and a half in tracking concerns expressed by the original framers of the U.S. Constitution regarding the need to balance the patent monopoly while stimulating healthy competition; that is, that patent law generally and the standard for obviousness specifi cally provides one of the more valuable mechanisms for government to weed out inventions that would not otherwise be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent, 92 and thereby to minimize ineffi cient transfers of wealth from a societal perspective. 93 The obviousness requirement therefore fulfi ls the important economic function of preventing undeserved monopoly profi ts. As noted in the companion paper in the context of complex innovation networks, poor government oversight of patent policy, legislation and regulation can lead to signifi cant social ineffi ciencies and costs to the public under conditions where monopoly pricing is maintained by overly broad, overly narrow or otherwise poorly thought out IPR rights. Reasoning of this nature permeates English, 94 American, 95 Australian, 96 as well as Canadian, 97 high courts. For example, in Graham, 98 the U.S. Supreme Court cited Thomas Jefferson to the effect that the policy underpinning the patent system properly dictates that inventions that are suffi ciently worthwhile to the public to warrant an exclusive patent must outweigh the restrictive effect of that monopoly.
To support a patent law which produces a minefi eld of non-inventive patents is "for all practical purposes to debilitate the patent system." 99 Similar sentiments were expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its leading Whirlpool decision, 100 where the court stated that improperly granted patents have the potential to signifi cantly "chill" competition, to the detriment of the public. The Solicitor General 101 stated in its KSR brief that SCOTUS jurisprudence stood for the historical proposition that the obviousness requirement is critical to ensure free exploitation of ideas is the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. 102 A standard that is too low entails substantial transaction costs to the public, as it renders patent examination and litigation more costly, grants patentees unjustifi ed rewards for disclosing non-innovative subject matter and forecloses competitors from using the public storehouse of knowledge that should be freely available to all. 103 It therefore prevents the public from benefi t of the full patent monopoly. This comports with the court's earlier decision in Graham, 104 where SCOTUS held that the patent system was a carefully crafted bargain designed to encourage the creation and disclosure of new technologies in return for the right to practise the invention. The text of KSR indicates a clear concern for the role of law in stimulating innovation, competition and progress in the useful arts, consistent with the Hotchkiss and Graham decisions and the language and narrative in the Solicitor General's infl uential brief. It is this language and narrative that are sorely missed in leading Canadian jurisprudence on obviousness, particularly that of the Federal Court of Appeal. Undue incentives in the form of weak patents and their easy leveraging into market monopolies via certain forms of IPR rights -such as overly permissive patent jurisprudence and legislation -have become particularly problematic in the pharmaceutical industry, owing to its increasing dependence on the patentability of "me too" and formulation-intensive "line extension" products. For this reason, effects that combine to produce higher costs for consumers and an unnecessary drag on innovation.
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IV. Summary & Conclusions
In KSR, SCOTUS retooled the standard for obviousness to bring it back in line with the court's previous decisions in Hotchkiss and Graham. A comparative review of the law of obviousness in the United States and Canada, and its relation to innovation and competition, was undertaken in Sections II and III. The focal point of observed differences is the inherent creativity and inventiveness of the PHOSITA, which in turn informs several binary and highly rigid aspects of Canadian patent law relevant to a statutory determination of obviousness. While American and English skilled technicians are viewed by courts in their parent jurisdictions as inherently creative and thus able to construe the prior art both implicitly and explicitly, the Canadian PHOSITA possesses not even a "mere scintilla" of inventiveness. As such, the reference point for the obviousness analysis in Canada, but not in the U.S. or U.K., is a PHOSITA who has much less than the average level of normative creativity, who is indeed no PHOSITA at all due to a de minimus level of creativity. The result in either case is removal of the PHOSITA from the obviousness determination, contrary to the provisions of Canadian patent legislation. As such, the current test for obviousness in Canada parallels in many important aspects the Federal Circuit's much maligned pre-KSR "teaching, suggestion, motivation" test that was explicitly overturned in KSR. For reasons discussed in Section III, jurisdictional differences of this nature not only have the potential to harm Canadian inventors and fi rms seeking to market innovative products globally, but may also, paradoxically, inhibit strong innovation by granting weak patents in the context of permissive legislation and regulations governing the approval and marketing of medical products.
